Laeven and Levine (2008) find that firms with multiple large shareholders (MLS) exhibit higher valuations than firms with a single large shareholder (SLS) structure, suggesting MLS play a significant corporate governance role. Using target abnormal returns at merger announcements for a sample of targets from 19 countries outside NorthAmerica, we find that the abnormal returns and first-bid-to-mergercompletion returns are negatively associated with the presence and power of MLS in these firms. We interpret this result as evidence that MLS firms are often valued higher than SLS firms; therefore, upon takeover the former receive a lower merger premium. In addition, our findings suggest that relinquishing MLS ownership structures in M&A results in negative abnormal returns and first to bid completion returns: implying that they are valued more as MLS, and earn upon announcement lower premium. We also examine the type of the second largest shareholder in the MLS structure of the target, and find that widely held firms are associated to a more pronounced negative effect, while families that exacerbate agency problems in the firm are associated with positive cumulative abnormal returns. 
INTRODUCTION
Instances of large shareholders in ownership structures are very common around the world including the United States (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986; La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Holderness, 2009) . The agency theory suggests that an economic rationale for such structures is that large shareholders can act as active monitors of managers who lacking incentives to maximize shareholders' wealth will likely engage in wealth expropriation activities and tunneling of corporate resources (Shleifer and Vishney, 1986; Burkart et al., 1997) . More recently, several studies note that corporate ownership structures more often than otherwise include typically more than one shareholder with large voting rights. Indeed, because minority shareholders are relatively dispersed, and hence less likely to exert a direct influence in the firm's decision making, the existence of one single large shareholder will likely generate conflicts of interest with the former. In order to fill the corporate governance void that surfaces due to the existence of one such dominant shareholder, other large shareholders may emerge, especially if external governance mechanisms are not effective enough to protect minority shareholders' rights. Whether multiple large shareholders (MLS) play an effective internal governance role and are able to reduce the expropriation of the firm's resources by insiders (i.e., the most powerful blockhoder or the manager) thus becomes a legitimate question. Although this issue has been recently addressed in the analytical (Zwiebel, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998; Noe, 2002; Bloch and Hege, 2003; Edmans and Manso, 2010; Dhillon and Rossetto, 2010) and empirical (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et al., 2008 Attig et al., , 2009 Mishra, 2011) literature , the results to date, remain inconclusive.
The literature identifies two forms of agency problems -between managers and shareholders in widely held firms (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Grossman and Hart, 1988) and between the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders in the firms controlled by an owner with concentrated ownership (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Burkart, et al., 1997) . Given the quality of external governance, the dominant shareholder is instrumental in mitigating agency problems between managers and shareholders by eliminating the incentives of managers to expropriate corporate resources (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) . However, such a dominant shareholder has also incentives to monitor managers in a way that serves his/her private interests (Laeven and Levine, 2008; Dhillon and Rossetto, 2010) and helps him/her reap private benefits of control from minority shareholders (Zingales, 1995; Dyke and Zingales, 2004) . In this paper, therefore, we use targets' announcement abnormal returns to examine whether the market perceives the presence and voting power of MLS as having a mitigating effect on the extent of expropriation of minority shareholders by the dominant shareholder
In particular, we consider a framework of Mergers and Acquisitions where target firms feature alternative ownership structures, for examples structures with multiple large blockholders (MLS) and those with single large dominant shareholder (SLS). We believe that such a context provides us with a natural laboratory to assess how the market reacts to the change in (relinquishment of) the prevailing ownership structure during acquisition transactions. The M&A literature suggests that merger transactions involve positive valuation effects of the quality of external governance: the merger premium for targets that originate from relatively poor investor protection is often higher (Bris and Cabolis, 2008) . In addition, targets tend to exhibit a value gain on acquisitions by a bidder that is domiciled in a better investor protection regime (Bris et al., 2008) . This "governance transfer" argument can also be applied to firms: after acquisition a target inherits the bidder's governance (Bris and Cabolis, 2008) and relinquishes its own.If MLS mitigate agency problems between the dominant shareholder and minority shareholders, one should expect that targets with MLS will exhibit lower returns upon their acquisition by another firm (relinquishment of good governance). As a result, these arguments suggest that upon acquisition, MLS targets are likely to exhibit a lower or negative market reaction compared to SLS targets.
Isolating the valuation effects around the announcement of exogenous changes in the ownership structure of the targets will help us determine whether MLS mitigate or exacerbate agency problems. Based on the recent analytical literature, two predictions can be put forward:
On the one hand, MLS may have similar incentives as those of the dominant shareholder, suggesting that they are likely to expropriate minority shareholders for private benefits. In this case, MLS are likely to collude with the dominant shareholder to share private benefits of control (e.g., Zwiebel, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998) . Even if the MLS do not collude with the dominant shareholder, a large number of blockholders may make the decision-making process less efficient by introducing gridlocks (Edmans and Manso, 2010) . Such inefficiency may in turn lead to underinvestment (i.e., sacrificing profitable opportunities in the hands of rivals). If these arguments hold, it is expected that the market will incorporate such information in the valuation of MLS firms, by discounting the latter. In this case, provided the winning bid price reflects the fair market value, the bid price paid to MLS targets is likely to include a relatively higher merger premium. As such, MLS targets should experience higher merger announcement abnormal returns.
On the other hand, if one (or more) large shareholder chooses to compete for corporate control against (rather than colluding with) other large shareholders, he/she will be driven by incentives similar to those of minority shareholders, thus favoring extensive monitoring of managers in order to maximize firm value. In this vein, Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) , and Bloch and Hege (2003) argue that MLS that compete for corporate control help to shift the balance of power to other minority shareholders thus shielding them from potential expropriation by closely monitoring managers' actions and decisions (e.g.,???). This argument also suggests that, instead of colluding with the dominant shareholder to extract private benefits of control, MLS may end up sacrificing their own share of such benefits as they prevent expropriation from the dominant shareholder (Nenova, 2003, Dhillon and Rossetto, 2010) . Other studies suggest that the lack of collusion among blockholders helps to reduce information asymmetry because the MLS who are unable to shift the voting outcome in their favor may end up voting "by their feet", by trading aggressively on firm's stocks, thus injecting information about the undesired outcome in stock prices (Neo, 2002; Edmans and Manso, 2010) . 1 This in turn will reduce the firm's cost of equity financing (Easley and O'Hara, 2004) and increase its valuation. The empirical evidence todate supports this argument by showing that MLS firms have higher valuations (Maury and Pajuste, 2005; Laeven and Levine, 2008; Attig et. al, 2009 ) and lower cost of capital (Attig et al., 1 For example, Edmans and Manso (2010, p. 2) argue that "By trading on private information, blockholders move the stock price toward fundamental value, and thus cause it to more closely reflect the effort exerted by the manager to enhance firm value. If the manager shirks or extracts private benefits, blockholders follow the "Wall Street Rule" of "voting with their feet" and selling to liquidity traders. This drives down the stock price, reducing the manager's equity compensation and thus punishing him ex post. However, such a mechanism elicits effort ex ante only if it is dynamically consistent. Once the manager has taken his action, blockholders cannot change it and are concerned only with maximizing their trading profits. A single blockholder will strategically limit her order to reduce the revelation of her private information. By contrast, multiple blockholders trade aggressively to compete for profits, as in a Cournot oligopoly. Total quantities (here, trading volumes) are higher than under monopoly, so more information is impounded in prices and they more closely reflect fundamental value and thus the manager's effort. Multiple blockholders therefore serve as a commitment device to reward or punish the manager ex post for his actions." 2008). If MLS enhance internal corporate governance, a likely consequence is that the valuation of MLS firms becomes more accurate and we thus expect the bid price paid to MLS targets to include a lower merger premium. As such, MLS targets should experience lower merger announcement abnormal returns.
Using a sample of targets featuring at least one dominant shareholder from nineteen countries outside North America in completed mergers announced between 1996 and 2004, we study if (and to what extent) the presence and voting power of MLS is associated with target announcement abnormal returns. We find that targets featuring MLS exhibit significantly lower announcement abnormal returns (and first-bid-to-merger-completion returns) compared to those featuring a single large (dominant) shareholder (SLS). The significant negative association between the presence and power of MLS and target returns continues to prevail after we control for several firm, industry and deal characteristics, the quality of corporate governance of bidders and targets country, and industry-, year-and country-effects. Moreover, the negative effect of MLS on target returns continues to prevail after addressing potential endogeneity issues following Laeven and Levine (2009) and Paligorova (2010) . In a nutshell, we find strong evidence that MLS firms are valued more than SLS firms, and hence upon acquisition, SLS firms exhibit a greater value gain.
In addition, to examine whether the market perception of second large shareholders depends on their type , we divide these latter in three groups, namely, Family, State and Widely Held. We find that the market considers that in widely held firms SLS are likely to reduce agency problems as merger returns to these targets are negative. Interestingly, we find that family SLS are perceived as exacerbating agency problems since their merger returns are significantly higher.
This result is consistent with the evidence that severe agency problems, tunneling and higher risk are observed in family controlled firms (e.g. Bae et al., 2002; Boubakri et al., 2009 ).
We contribute to the literature by examining the value premium that the market assigns to MLS firms. Overall, we find that the market assigns about 5% value premium for the presence of MLS in the firms' ownership structure. In that, we uphold the findings in the literature such The rest of the paper is organized as follows: we present the sample and the data in section 2. We next describe our results of the univariate and multivariate analyses, followed by robustness checks in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We use a sample of 511 targets from 7 East Asian and 12 Western European countries with ownership data available in either Claessens et al. (2000) or Faccio and Lang (2002) Using the DataStream daily total return index for individual targets, we first estimate daily returns. Likewise, using the DataStream country market and global market total return index, we estimate daily index returns as daily changes in a domestic market index (domestic market returns) and daily changes in a global market index (global market returns) respectively.
We start by estimating our main proxy of target abnormal returns, which is the sum of excess target returns over the global market index returns computed using a five day event window (event day -2 to +2 days) (CAR5). 2 We also estimate CAR5_C based on excess target returns over domestic market returns and CAR5_E based on excess target returns over those estimated using two factor market model, that uses 200 day estimation window for generating model parameters (-21 to -220 days), where two factors are domestic market returns and global market returns.
Cumulative abnormal returns are also calculated from the first bid to the merger completion date using all these three methods, which are denoted as CarFBC -for those based on excess over global index return , CarFBC_C -for those based on excess over domestic market index returns and CarFBC_E -for those based on excess over estimates from a two factor market model, respectively. In our tests, we focus on CAR5 as the main test variable and use all the other proxies of target abnormal returns in the robustness tests. For the sample of firms with a non missing value for CAR5, we extract the following annual financial data from DataStream Database: Log Assets (log of total assets), Tobin's Q, ROA (return on assets) and Leverage (total debt by total assets) for the fiscal year ending before the event day. We exclude all events for which one of these data points are missing. 
MLS Variables
Using ownership data available in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) , we create the MLS variables we follow the existing literature (Attig et al., 2008 (Attig et al., , 2009 . Please note that our sample is restricted to the firms where at least one dominant shareholder with 10% or more voting rights exists.
Presence of MLS
We create two proxies to capture the presence and the extent of MLS in the ownership structure. Presence2 is coded as a dummy with '1' for firms that have at least two large shareholders featuring at least 10% voting rights each, and '0' otherwise. The second large shareholder would limit the power of the dominant shareholder to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders if s/he competes for corporate control, suggesting an efficient monitoring role (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Attig. et al., 2008) . Under this hypothesis MLS firms are likely to be worth more than similar SLS firms, suggesting a lower return for such targets upon merger announcement. In contrast, if the second largest shareholder opts to join hands with the dominant shareholder for extracting private benefits, the firms featuring MLS would be undervalued suggesting higher returns for targets upon takeover. The sign of presencePresence2 with CAR5 therefore depends on whether the MLS generally play the former or the latter role.
However, what about the number of large shareholders beyond the second large shareholder? Edmans and Manso (2010) argue that if there are many blockholders, it is difficult to attain agreement among them for an efficient monitoring of managers. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) also support this argument that the presence of several blockholders reduces efficient decision making, suggesting a poor valuation of firms with several blockholders. In addition, if monitoring costs in a firm are prohibitive, multiple large shareholders may not play a monitoring role (Dhillon and Rossetto, 2010) , and consequently they may prompt to either exit the firm or join hands with the large shareholder to extract a share of private benefits. Edmans and Manso (2010), however, also argue that the disagreed blockholders, may choose to vote by their feet and inject information in the market price by trading on their firm's stock holdings.
Their model predicts MLS's trading behavior improves price efficiency and therefore increases firm value. Empirical evidence shows that increase in trading volume due to blockholder trading reduces trading profit (Gallagher, Gardner, and Swan, 2010) , and the increase in the number of blockholders increases price informativeness (Gorton, Huang, and Kang, 2010) . Apart from this, research shows that MLS's trading behavior disciplines managerial compensation (Smith and Swan, 2008) . Consequently, MLS effectively reduce information asymmetry, implying a positive valuation effect of MLS. To capture the number of blockholders, we create Presence2345, which represents the total number of MLS beyond the dominant shareholder, with a maximum of 4.
Overall, under this argument, we expect lower returns for MLS targets (vs. SLS targets) upon merger announcements.
Power of MLS
We create two proxies to measure the absolute power of MLS, namely the voting power of the second largest shareholder (Vote2) and that of the four large shareholders beyond the dominant shareholder (Vote2345), as well as two additional proxies to measure the power of MLS relative to the dominant shareholder, namely (Vote2/1 Ratio and Vote2345/1 Ratio). Dhillon and Rossetto (2010, p. 4) investors." The efficient monitoring hypothesis suggests that the power of MLS should be positively associated with pre-merger value premium, and hence negatively associated with target returns upon merger announcement.
Role of Family vs. Non-Family MLS:
Whether the second largest shareholder (thus MLS) uses its presence or power to mitigate or exacerbate agency problems may depend on its type. Therefore, we start by dividing all second largest shareholders into three categories and create a dummy variable for each. Family2 takes the value of 1 if the second largest shareholder is a family or individual, 0 otherwise. State2 takes the value of 1 if the second large shareholder is the government or a government agency, 0 otherwise.
Widely2 takes the value 1 if the second large shareholder is a widely held corporation or institutions, 0 otherwise.
As discussed above, the theory predicts both possibilities (i.e.
monitoring by the second largest shareholder or helping to extract private benefits of control) as equally likely. Indeed, the second largest shareholder may be associated with value destruction, for s/he may have incentives to create environments that help to extract private benefits of control (e.g., Winton, 1993; Zwiebel, 1995; Kahn and Winton, 1998) . Also, MLS may have little incentives to take private benefits of control, and may instead use their power to monitor the activities of the largest shareholder (and managers) in favor of minority shareholders (e.g., Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000; Bloch and Hege, 2003; Nenova, 2003; Dhillon and Rossetto, 2010) . The incentives to create environments to extract private benefits by the second largest shareholder are likely to be higher, if s/he is a family or individual, rather than an institution and the government for several reasons: First, their large stake in the firm often leaves families with an undiversified wealth (Anderson and Reeb, 2003) , and families have a desire to transfer control to future generations (e.g., Anderson et al., 2003) and thus may shun value maximizing high operating risk projects in favor of diversification to reduce the possibility of bankruptcy (see e.g., John et al., 2008; Mishra, 2011) . Second, the private benefits extracted by widely held institutions are divisible among a large number of their shareholders, while those by family or individual are not divisible (Ellul et al., 2009 ) therefore families have incentives to risk extracting such benefits. Therefore, the role of family as the second largest shareholder is less predictable suggesting that, unlike firms featuring other types of SLS, targets featuring family as the SLS may not be as valued, and therefore may not suffer as much the cost of relinquishing the governance. Moreover, if the second largest shareholder is a family then it is expected to exacerbate agency problems. This suggests that such targets may, indeed, be undervalued and are thus expected to exhibit a positive market reaction upon relinquishing such governance environment.
Control Variables
We control for firm, industry and deal characteristics following the existing literature (e.g. Wang and Xie, 2009; Bradly et al., 1988; Bris and Cabolis, 2008) , all of which are defined in Appendix A.
For the fiscal year-end proceeding the event year, we estimate natural log of total assets (Log Assets), Tobin's Q, Return on Assets (ROA), and total debt to total assets (Leverage). We measure competitiveness of the target's industry using the Hersfindhal index. Among the deal characteristics, friendly mergers (Friendly), deals involving tender offer (Tender Offer), cross border merger (cross-border), cash only consideration (Cash Only), and ownership status dummy for bidder (Private Bidder) are included. We also control for industry effects using industry dummies created using Fama-French 12 industries 3 classification, year effects using year dummies, and country effects using country dummies.
The properties of test and other regression variables are reported in Table 2 , starting with properties of ownership variables in Panel A, target characteristics in Panel B and deal characteristics in Panel C. We observe that about forty six percent of the firms with a dominant shareholder have at least two large shareholders. Table 3 reports the correlation coefficients between our variables. They do not appear too large to raise concern for multicolliniarity.
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here Table 4 presents a univariate test of target returns (CAR5 and CarFBC) between firms with a dominant shareholder (SLS) and those with multiple large shareholders (MLS). Indeed, we note that MLS targets exhibit a substantially lower market reaction to merger announcement compared to SLS firms, both with and without an adjustment for country effects. First, we test the difference in CAR5 adjusted for country medians (adjCAR5) between SLS and MLS targets, and find that adjCAR5 are significantly lower for MLS firms. Second, we test the difference in first bid to merger completion abnormal returns (CarFBC) adjusted for country medians (adjCarFBC), which is significantly lower for MLS targets. 4 These results provide initial evidence that there is a value premium for having MLS in the ownership structure; therefore, in acquisitions of such targets, the premium embedded in the offer price is not as high as that for targets with one single dominant shareholder. In other words, targets with single dominant shareholders are significantly undervalued prior to merger announcement, and experience upon acquisition a significantly higher value gain for two reasons i) the market positively reacts to the removal of the severe agency problems that existed in such firms and ii) bidders are more likely to pay higher premium due to the undervaluation of such targets. Conversely for MLS targets, i) the market negatively reacts to the removal of good internal governance that existed in such firms and ii)
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Univariate Results
bidders are more likely to pay lower relative premium due to the value premium embedded in their pre-announcement market price. The average difference in the announcement returns for targets with MLS and SLS firms is the value premium for having MLS in the ownership structure.
This finding provides further evidence in support of prior literature that MLS help mitigate agency problems between the dominant shareholder and other minority shareholders by monitoring managers or competing for corporate control (Attig et al., 2008; Mishra, 2011) . More importantly, such role of MLS appears to be valued by the market. To test these findings more thoroughly, we test this conjecture below in a multivariate framework using a full set of control variables.
Insert Table 4 We extend our analysis to other properties of target ownership structures. In model 3, we find that Vote2 -measuring the absolute power of the second largest shareholder -is negatively (significant at 10% level) associated with CAR5, and similarly, in model 4, Vote2/1 -measuring the power of the second large shareholder in relation to the dominant shareholder -negatively (significant at 1% level) associated with CAR5. Consistent with earlier findings, and our expectation, this suggests that both absolute and relative power of the second large shareholder helps mitigate agency problems and thus increase the valuation of the firms resulting in a lower takeover premium for these targets. However, we do not find the presence and power of the large shareholder beyond the second largest shareholder to be significantly associated with CAR5.
Type of 2 nd large shareholder:
The literature suggests that the identity of the large shareholders affects their incentives What about the type of the dominant shareholder? The international evidence suggests that family controlled firms are more prone to expropriation of minority shareholders compared to other type of firms (Boubakri et al., 2010; Bae et al. 2002) , while controversies exist. Therefore, it is natural to expect that the firms featuring family as dominant shareholder likely would be less valued prior to merger. In such firms, what kind of role the second largest shareholder plays is also unclear a priori. Therefore, in Table 12 we devide our sample of targets into two groups, family controlled (Family1) and non-family controlled (Non-Family) to examine the role of the second large shareholder in such firms. We find that, models 1 & 2 show that in the firms featuring non-family dominants shareholders Presence2 and Vote2/1 significantly negatively associated with CAR5. This suggests that in such firms that are non-family and feature MLS in ownership structure are perceived as better governed firms such that upon acquisition (upon relinquishing such governance structure) there is a significant negative market reaction.
In summary, the findings in Table 5 highlight the importance of ownership structures with MLS in mitigating firms' agency problems and suggest that the market effectively puts a value to the presence and power of MLS, such that relinquishing such ownership structures is counterproductive. Further the findings in Table 6 suggest that the type of second large shareholder has important implications for the role of MLS in firm's agency problems. The family as the second large shareholder appears to exacerbate agency problems, while widely held public firm as the second large shareholder mitigates such agency problems.
Insert Tables 5 and 6 about here
Robustness Checks
The results presented in Table 5 , have several limitations as they are based on a set of assumptions and a set of estimation techniques. Therefore, in this section, we present robustness of our results to relaxing such assumptions and using new estimation techniques for generating the dependent variable.
Basic Sensitivity Tests:
In Table 5 , standard errors are Hubert and White corrected, however, this does not address potential cross-sectional correlation within industries. Therefore, in Table 7 we replicate our core tests after correcting for industry clustering and find that our results remain the same. One minor exception is that we find Presence2345 to be significantly negatively associated with CAR5, which suggests the presence of more shareholders is significantly valuable. Similarly, in Table 5, Table 8 , we replicate our key tests using year effects (in models 1 and 2), the abnormal returns estimated in excess of
DataStream country market index (CAR5_C, in models 3 and 4), and the abnormal returns estimated in excess of expected returns estimated using the two factor model featuring
DataStream country market index and DataStream global market index (CAR5_E in models 5 and 6). In all these models, we find that our results relating to the effect of presence and relative power of MLS continue to hold. Further, our main results are based on the abnormal returns estimated using a five day event window. To test the sensitively of our results to the choice of the event window, and in particular to mitigate the effect of any instances of insider trading prior to the merger announcement, we replicate our results using an 11 day event window (CAR11), and a 3 day event window (CAR3). In untabulated results, our conclusions continue to hold in using
Further, the target's shareholders do not realize the gains from the sale of the firm until the merger is completed. Therefore, the abnormal returns measured over the five day event window do not necessarily represent both premiums received for target shares and the effect of relinquishing existing governance. To mitigate this concern, we follow Bargeron et al. (2008) and estimate cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the targets from the first bid to the completion date (FBC). We denote these abnormal returns as CarFBC, CarFBC_C and CarFBC_E respectively for abnormal returns estimated as excess over expected returns based on market model with DataStream country market index, excess over the returns on DataStream country market index, excess over expected returns from two factor model using DataStream country and global market index. We present the results of the tests that use these dependent variables in Table 9 . In all models reported in Table 9 , our key findings remain unchanged to the use of alternative dependent variables.
Insert Tables 7 and 8 about here
Country Effects & Investor Protection.
First, in our data UK is disproportionately represented and some countries such as Austria and Indonesia have as low as only one target firm represented. Therefore, it is crucial that our results hold in the full sample with country effects, in the sample that includes only U.K., and in the sample that excludes countries that are thinly represented. In Table 10 , we start by excluding in Model 1 all countries that have only one firm represented in the sample, in Model 2 the countries that have two or less firms, in Model 3 the countries that have three or less firms represented and in Model 4 all countries other than United Kingdom. Our results hold in the full sample, the subsa mple of targets from U.K. only and the subsamples that exclude the countries that are thinly represented. Second, in Model 5, we control for the investor protection proxies of the bidder's country and target's country. The investor protection proxy is extracted from http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings, which ranks countries based on their ability to protect investors. The investor protection index incorporates a country's extent of disclosure index, director liability index and shareholder suits index. We find that the target's country level investor protection index loads with a positive coefficient that is significant at 10% level. We interpret this result as suggesting that while target's firm level governance now depends on the acquirer's investor protection, the target's assets are still subject to the jurisdiction of the laws where the target operates. Therefore the legal institutions in the country where the target firm operates continue to matter even after the acquisition of the firm by an acquirer featuring legal institutions of another country. However, the effect of the presence and relative power of MLS continues to be robust to these controls. Third, in model 6 we control for the difference between investor protection and in model 7 we introduce the interaction of investor protection and Presence2 respectively. While we do not observe much significant effect of the country's' investor protection environment in CAR5, our core findings about the role of MLS remain the same after these controls.
Insert Tables 9 and 10 about here While we control for the bidder's country level investor protection as discussed above, this investor protection index neither does necessarily fully capture availability and implementation of investor protection in a country nor does come without measurement errors. To mitigate the concern about the quality of the proxy of investor protection of the bidder's country and its eventual effect on our findings, we replicate our tests using the sample of mergers featuring a bidder from the United Kingdom. In untabulated results, we find that CAR5 loads significantly negatively with Presence2 and Vote2/1. This further confirms that the bidder's country level investor protection does not drive our results mitigating any concern that the weakness of investor protection proxy may have affected these results. Accordingly, the results presented in Model 4 that include targets from United Kingdom only further confirms that our results are not driven by the investor protection environment of the target's country and our selection of sample countries.
Endogeneity of MLS Structures
The key endogeneity issue in this paper is the possibility of change in ownership structures postmerger in cases where the payment is made in stock. The acquirer's ownership structure is likely to change according to the target's ownership structure. For example, if the target has significant blockholder(s), these blockholders may remain significant in the acquirer's ownership structure.
Similarly, if the target firm has dispersed ownership, this may dilute the ownership of the acquirer's existing blockhoders to the point that they may end up being insignificant blockholders. In the stock only mergers such change in the acquirer's ownership structure may affect the market reaction to targets upon acquisitions. In order to mitigate this concern, we replicate our key results using cash only mergers (179 observations). We find that the coefficient of Presence2 is negative and significant at 10% level in this subsample, practically ruling out the possibility that our results are an outcome of this endogeneity issue.
Second, as argued by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , La Porta et al. (1999) , and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) a firm's ownership structure is an outcome of its contracting environment. In that, our research is likely to suffer from an omitted-variable problem. We addressed the omitted variable problem using country, year and industry fixed effects.
Third, the same arguments of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) , La Porta et al. (1999) , and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) also suggest the possibility of reverse causality between ownership structure and target valuation because individuals and institutions may self select good quality firms thus becoming significant blockholder in the firm, however, may choose to stay as passive investors effectively not influencing the firm's decision making. We address this problem using the instrumental variable approach. Since, such behavior of large blockholders is unlikely to influence country year average of ownership structure; we instrument MLS variables using the country year averages of their firm level counterparts. In unreported results using instrumental variable two stage least squares, we find that our results continue to hold. This analysis largely rules out the possibility of endogeneity of ownership structure driving our
results, yet, the lack of long time series of ownership data prevents us from testing this issue more thoroughly by using dynamic panel tests to provide stronger tests to correct such endogeneity issues.
CONCLUSION
We use a sample of targets featuring at least one dominant shareholder from nineteen Western European and East Asian countries announced between 1996 and 2004. In this sample of completed mergers we study if the presence and voting power of Multiple Large Shareholder (MLS) is associated with target returns. We find that targets featuring MLS exhibit significantly lower announcement abnormal returns and lower first bid to merger completion returns compared to those featuring a single dominant shareholder (SLS). These results continue to prevail after we control for several firm, industry and deal characteristics, the quality of corporate governance of bidders and target's country, industry and year. We interpret these findings as evidence that MLS firms are often more valuable than SLS firms resulting in a lesser merger premium upon takeover. These findings suggest that there is a positive cost of relinquishing MLS ownership structures relative to SLS ownership structures. We also find that the governance role of the second large shareholder in target firm is contingent on its type. The family as the SLS exacerbates agency problems, while the widely held firm mitigates such problems.
We do acknowledge the endogeneity of complex ownership structures, and show that the negative effect of MLS on target returns continues to prevail after addressing some potential endogeneity issues following Laeven and Levine (2009) 
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CAR5_E
The cumulative excess returns over the returns over two factor model returns, for the 5-day event window (-2, +2). The table presents the summary statistics of the target returns (CAR) of the sample acquisitions by year. The sample includes targets originally drawn from 7 East Asian countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and 12 Western European countries represented in Faccio and Lang (2002) . The CAR5 is the cumulative abnormal returns over market returns for 5-day event window (-2, +2) where market returns are based on DataStream global market index. The table presents relationship between target announcement abnormal returns and presence and voting rights of the multiple large shareholders in target's ownership structure. The sample drawn from nineteen target's countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are estimated using excess returns over DataStream global market index for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are estimated using excess returns over DataStream global market index for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The table presents relationship between target announcement abnormal returns and presence and voting rights of the multiple large shareholders in target's ownership structure. The sample drawn from nineteen target's countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are estimated using excess returns over DataStream global market index for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors with industry clustering are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The table presents robustness tests for the relationship between target announcement abnormal returns and presence and voting rights of the multiple large shareholders in target's ownership structure. The sample drawn from nineteen target's countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are estimated using excess returns over DataStream global market index (CAR5), excess returns over DataStream country market index (Car5_C) and excess returns over the two factor (DataStream global and country market indices) market model (Car5_E) for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. Tstatistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. CarFBC_C) and excess returns over the two factor (DataStream global and country market indices) market model (CarFBC_E) for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are estimated using excess returns over DataStream global market index for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The table presents relationship between target announcement returns (Car5) and presence and voting rights of the multiple large shareholders in target's ownership structure. The sample drawn from nineteen target's countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. Car5 is cumulative abnormal returns for event day (+2,-2). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. T-statistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. The table presents relationship between target first bid to completion date returns (CarFBC) and presence and voting rights of the multiple large shareholders in target's ownership structure. The sample drawn from nineteen target's countries represented in Claessens et al. (2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002) includes 511 mergers taken place between 1996 and 2004 which have at least one large shareholder in ownership structure. First bid to complete date (FBC) returns are estimated using excess returns over datastream global market index (CarFBC), excess returns over datastream country market index (CarFBC_C) and excess returns over the two factor (datastream global and country market indices) market model (CarFBC_E). All control variables are defined in Appendix A.1. Tstatistics based on robust standard errors are presented inside the parenthesis, *,**, and *** refer to significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
